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Submergence 
Precarious Politics in Colombia’s Future Port-City 
 
Austin Zeiderman 
Department of Geography and Environment 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
This article examines popular politics under precarious conditions in the rapidly 
expanding port-city of Buenaventura on Colombia’s Pacific coast. It begins by 
identifying the intersecting economic, ecological, and political forces contributing to the 
precarity of life in Buenaventura’s intertidal zone. Focusing on conflicts over land in the 
waterfront settlements of Bajamar (meaning “low-tide”), it then describes the efforts of 
Afro-Colombian settlers and activists to defend their territories against threats of violence 
and displacement. In doing so, they must navigate historical legacies of ethno-racial 
politics as well as formations of liberal governance and their multicultural and 
biopolitical logics of vulnerability and protection. The socio-material conditions of the 
intertidal zone, and in particular the figure of submergence, are used to illuminate the 
forms of political life in Colombia’s future port-city. The struggles of Afro-Colombians 
to contest violent dispossession in Buenaventura reflect the racialized politics of precarity 
under late liberalism. 
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“Beautiful seaport, my Buenaventura, where the pure breeze always blows.” 
    Petronio Álvarez, “Mi Buenaventura,” 1931 
 
Thus begins a song written in 1931 by Petronio Álvarez, a machinist on the 
railroad running inland from the Pacific coast of Colombia, in honor of his native city. 
Entitled “My Buenaventura,” it gained popularity throughout the country following its 
1952 release by a prominent record label, and it remains the hymn of the southern Pacific 
region to this day. The song is a currulao—the musical style closely associated with 
Colombians of African descent who were brought as slaves to mine for gold during the 
colonial period, and who now predominate in this part of the country. Most notably, it 
evokes two key characteristics of the city to which it pays homage. 
First, Álvarez’s lyrics glorify the fact that Buenaventura, ever since it was 
founded by Spanish explorers in 1540, and especially after the Panama Canal opened in 
1914, has been first and foremost a port—an aperture through which people, goods, and 
wealth could pass—rather than a permanent settlement in its own right (Suárez Reyes 
2010:2491). Second, “My Buenaventura” invokes an intimate, even erotic partnership 
between land and sea: “You lovely port, surrounded by the sea,” it swoons; “sparkling 
waves come and kiss you.” Children learning to play the marimba still sing the 
emblematic song. But the two relationships it conjures up—between port and city; 
between land and sea—are not nearly as harmonious as they once were in Álvarez’s 
lyrical imagination. 
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Buenaventura is still known colloquially as “el Puerto,” perhaps more fittingly 
now that it moves a greater volume of merchandise than anywhere else in Colombia. But 
for many this nickname now signifies an indictment of the unequal, conflictual 
relationship between the city and the port rather than a celebration of the latter’s 
mounting importance to the national economy. The port generates a limited amount of 
employment in Buenaventura, mostly for workers brought in from elsewhere, and the city 
is by far Colombia’s poorest and least developed (Ministerio de Trabajo 2012). 
Buenaventura has a 30% unemployment rate, 80% of its inhabitants live below the 
poverty line, 65% of households do not have a sewage system, 45% lack potable water, 
and life expectancy is 51 years, 11 less than the national average (Nicholls and Sánchez-
Garzoli 2011:4). “It’s a massive port with an inconsequential city attached to it,” Manuel, 
a teacher, told me. “Nothing stays here and nothing gets invested; everything just moves 
through on its way to somewhere else. This is the history of Buenaventura, and it 
continues right up to the present,” he said. “The white and mestizo elite who control and 
benefit from the port make sure the city and its people get the bare minimum; they invest 
only what’s necessary for their goods to make it up to Cali or Bogotá. That’s it. We call it 
un puerto-ciudad, not una ciudad-puerto,” he quipped, inverting the usual sequence of 
the terms “port” and “city” in Spanish. 
Buenaventura’s sole vocation as a seaport is due not only to the containers of 
televisions, shoes, and cars entering the bay, or to the sacks of coffee and sugar leaving it; 
in recent years, it has become a primary outlet for drug shipments from Colombia to the 
rest of the world. Vital for trade, both legal and illegal, waterfront territories in and 
around Buenaventura are exceedingly valuable and ferociously fought over by rival 
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militias, who alternate between decimating each other’s ranks and terrorizing the local 
population. The intertidal zone—the land adjacent to the sea that is periodically 
submerged—has endured repeated acts of violence and dispossession, which have 
displaced thousands from their homes, and everyday life there is highly precarious. 
Sparkling waves do still come and kiss the shores of this beautiful seaport, but they now 
sometimes carry with them a dead body or two, often dismembered or decapitated before 
being dumped offshore. 
The relationship between the port and the city, between land and sea, is at the 
heart of the territorial conflicts ravaging Buenaventura. These conflicts are fueled by 
three intersecting forces, which contribute to the precarity of life in the city’s seaside 
settlements and to the displacement of their inhabitants: forecasts of free trade and 
economic development motivate plans for turning Buenaventura into a “world-class” 
port; projections of increased flood risk associated with climate change underpin 
relocation programs in zones of pronounced vulnerability; and competition for control 
over strategically important waterfront areas leads to violent clashes between criminal 
gangs and state security forces. These three forces—port expansion, climate change 
adaptation, and paramilitary violence—converge on the seaside shantytown of Bajamar 
(meaning “low-tide”) built and inhabited by Afro-Colombian settlers. There activists and 
residents struggle to defend their territories against the threat of displacement. Focusing 
on territorial conflicts in the waterfront settlements of Bajamar, this article uses socio-
material conditions of the intertidal zone, and in particular the figure of submergence, to 
illuminate precarious forms of political life in Colombia’s future port-city.1 
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The structure of the argument is as follows. The first section discusses the 
article’s conceptual problematic, which is how to understand popular politics under 
conditions of protracted precarity. Drawing critiques of liberal multiculturalism, race, and 
colonialism into conversation with political ecology and science and technology studies, 
it proposes “submergence” as an analytical device. Designating the state of being 
inundated by a relative rise in water levels, submergence draws our attention to the socio-
material relationship between people and the environment in the waterfront settlements of 
Buenaventura’s intertidal zone. In addition to this more literal meaning, submergence 
also points to forms of cultural and political practice that are forced or resigned to float 
above and below the surface or move in and out of sight. The second section then 
discusses what makes submergence strategic, even necessary, as a form of popular 
politics by identifying the intersecting economic, ecological, and political forces 
contributing to the precarity of life in Buenaventura’s intertidal zone. It is followed by a 
third section that concentrates on the self-built settlements of Bajamar, where the 
convergence of these forces generates recurrent waves of violence and displacement. The 
fourth section then shows how Afro-Colombian settlers and activists are positioned, and 
position themselves, as legal and political subjects: that is, how their efforts to resist 
dispossession are both enabled and constrained by historical legacies of ethno-racial 
politics as well as multicultural and biopolitical logics of liberal governance. In 
conclusion, “submergent politics” is elaborated as a way to make sense of the forms of 
political life specific to the territorial conflicts underway in Colombia’s future port-city as 
well as those unfolding under similar circumstances in other parts of the world. 
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Precarious Politics in the Intertidal Zone 
The following analysis of precarious forms of political life departs from a concern 
for the limits of liberalism in both theory and practice. Elizabeth Povinelli defines “late 
liberalism” as a “formation of power” that fuses neoliberalism and multiculturalism, and 
that emerged in the 1960s in response to widespread crises of political, economic, and 
social legitimacy (2013a:30-31).
2
 Povinelli contends that liberal governance “solved 
these legitimacy crises by arguing that the population of the nation-state would be 
secured against harm if it were opened to the precarious character of life as difference” 
(2013a:31, my emphasis). In contrast to classical theories of liberalism centered on 
universal freedom of the autonomous individual, liberal governance would prioritize the 
protection of collective forms of life deemed culturally and economically valuable while 
rendering others increasingly precarious (Povinelli 2011). “Precarity” would eventually 
become a defining characteristic of late-liberal life, labor, ecology, and citizenship 
(Butler 2004; Bear and Mathur 2015; Allison 2013; Berlant 2011; Weston 2012). By 
analyzing popular responses to violence, displacement, and dispossession in 
Buenaventura’s waterfront settlements, this article considers how precarious forms of 
political life navigate formations of liberal governance and their logics of vulnerability 
and protection. 
In Colombia, as elsewhere, liberal governance is entangled with the ethno-racial 
politics of recognition accompanying state multiculturalism (Escobar 2008; Jackson 
2007; Rappaport 2005; Wade 1993). As security saturates the realm of the political 
(Rojas 2009), rights and citizenship are often predicted on both multicultural and 
biopolitical rationalities of rule (Zeiderman 2013). But the politics of life in Colombia is 
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also a politics of death (Ballvé 2013), and a deeply racialized one (Foucault 2003; 
Mbembe 2003). The capacity of certain forms of life to survive, endure, or flourish—
while others are abandoned, extinguished, or left to go extinct—is distributed unevenly 
according to racial regimes of hierarchy and dispossession that persist within liberalism 
(Povinelli 2011). The result is what Rinaldo Walcott (2014) calls “zones of black death,” 
or geographical nodes throughout the Americas where forms of diasporic African life are 
dehumanized, devalued, and discarded, and the city of Buenaventura is an extreme 
example. This article aims to disrupt the anti-blackness that underpins the 
disproportionate distribution of violence along racial lines by asking what forms of 
political life are possible and impossible under such circumstances.
3
 
The cultural practices proper to the African diaspora in the Americas are taken up 
by Caribbean poet and intellectual Kamau Brathwaite.
4
 Brathwaite proposes the concept 
of “nation language” to refer to the original languages spoken by those brought to the 
Caribbean as slaves and laborers (1984:5-8). The term he prefers for understanding the 
fate of such languages is “submergence” for they “had to…submerge themselves” 
beneath the official languages of public discourse—English, French, Spanish, or Dutch—
dictated by the colonial rulers (1984:7). “Submerged languages” and the subjects who 
spoke them were considered inferior (non-human, in fact). They persisted, nonetheless; 
their rhythm, timbre, grammar, and syntax were always coursing beneath the surface, 
making themselves imperceptible at certain moments and perceptible at others.
5
 
Submerged languages were neither static nor exclusive to the subaltern; they were 
constantly being adapting to dominant cultural imperatives as well as influencing how 
official languages were spoken by both the colonizers and the colonized (1984:7-8). For 
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Brathwaite, “submergence” is key to understanding contemporary forms of Caribbean 
cultural practice. In the literature, poetry, and music he analyzed, what had long been 
submerged was “increasingly coming to the surface” (1984:13, my emphasis). 
Seawater is clearly important, both concretely and metaphorically, for 
Brathwaite’s understanding of diasporic African culture. Indeed, remarking on processes 
of historical change, Brathwaite adopts the concept of tidalectics as an alternative to 
Hegelian/Marxian dialectics, more ebb and flow than linear progression. As with his use 
of “submergence,” the rhythms and oscillations of the tides are, for Brathwaite, central to 
the formation of historical consciousness in the Caribbean and, therefore, analytically 
appropriate for understanding its cultural forms (Sandiford, 2011:142). The work of the 
Saint Lucian poet and playwright Derek Walcott is a paradigmatic example. The sea 
features prominently in much of Walcott’s writing, representing both “troubled memories 
and histories” and “solidarity and common experience” (Jefferson, 2013:301). 
Brathwaite’s assertion that “unity is submarine” (1974:64) takes this identification further 
by suggesting that beneath the surface of the sea, along with the bodies of slaves who did 
not survive the Middle Passage, is a submerged, contiguous political geography that 
unifies the peoples of the Caribbean Basin (Jefferson 2013:290). Here, histories of 
slavery, colonialism, and racialization become the medium through which anti-racist, 
decolonial, and utopian futures are imagined and pursued (McKittrick 2013; Kelley 2003; 
Pulido 2006). In the case of Afro-Colombian politics and poetics, the Pacific Ocean is at 
least as important as the Caribbean/Atlantic (cf. Gilroy 1993). Nevertheless, Brathwaite’s 
engagement with the latter provides an opening for understanding cultural and political 
forms in and around Buenaventura’s intertidal zone. 
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Political ecology and science and technology studies belong to a different 
tradition, and yet their interest in “nature/culture” allows for productive conversation with 
Brathwaite’s critical theories of race, culture, and colonialism.6 Marisol de la Cadena 
shows how “indigenous cosmopolitics” in the Andes has the potential to radically 
transform a postcolonial political order based on binary separations (human/nonhuman, 
European/other, etc.) into a “pluriversal politics” comprised of “partially connected 
heterogeneous socionatural worlds negotiating their ontological disagreements 
politically” (2010:360). In a similar vein, Brathwaite’s “submergence” takes on even 
greater significance when extended to nonhuman environments and infrastructures and 
the political formations that accompany them. Following analyses of the material and 
technical attributes of hydrological and hydraulic systems and the kinds of politics they 
engender (Anand 2011; von Schnitzler 2008; Carse 2014; Meehan 2014; Furlong 2013; 
Gandy 2014), “submergence” can be understood as simultaneously socio-material and 
techno-political, encompassing the wide range of forces that condition specific forms of 
political life. The concept also shifts the locus of political analysis from land to water 
(Helmreich 2011; Steinberg and Peters 2015), or more precisely to the interstitial spaces 
that defy the terrestrial/aquatic binary (Morita and Bruun Jensen; ten Bos 2009).
7
 Based 
on the socio-material conditions of Buenaventura’s intertidal zone, the remainder of this 
article will sketch the outlines of a submergent form of political life, where the struggles 
of Afro-Colombians to contest violent dispossession reflect the racialized politics of 
precarity under late liberalism. 
 
Fluid Futures 
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The relationship between land and sea in Buenaventura is being reconfigured by 
three intersecting forces, each of which contributes to the precarity of life in the intertidal 
zone and to the displacement of its inhabitants. The first is economic in nature. The 
national and local governments both envision a future in which Buenaventura will 
become a “world-class port city,” as is reflected in the jointly authored local economic 
development plan of the same name (Ministerio de Trabajo 2012). Doing so, the plan 
wagers, is the key to strengthening the country’s global competitiveness and improving 
employment access and income generation for the city. As Colombia’s only Pacific 
Ocean port, enthusiasm for Buenaventura’s rapidly rising “good fortune” (which is, after 
all, the literal meaning of its name) is tied to projections of booming trade relations with 
Asia. With commentators far and wide heralding the advent of the “Chinese century,” 
Buenaventura has been labeled “Colombia’s gateway to the Pacific,” which the local 
development plan calls the “basin of the future.” Lucrative transoceanic fantasies also 
inspire the burgeoning Pacific Alliance, which seeks greater economic integration and 
reduced tariff barriers between Colombia, Mexico, Chile, and Peru. Meanwhile, a free 
trade agreement with Colombia’s largest trading partner, the United States, which went 
into effect in 2012, promises a $1.1 billion expansion of imports, many of which would 
be destined for Buenaventura. 
These visions of free trade and economic development, however fantastical, are 
beginning to produce material effects in Buenaventura, but not in the form of wealth or 
prosperity for the local population, which has long been denied a share of the profits 
generated by the port. Colombian ports were privatized in the early 1990s through 
concessions granted to regional port “societies,” which in turn contracted private 
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companies to manage their facilities and operations (Gaviria 1998). With the abolition of 
labor unions and other measures designed to lower costs and boost profits, Colombian 
ports began to attract interest from around the world (Jiménez Pérez and Delgado Moreno 
2008). To accommodate, but also to entice, the anticipated increase of goods passing 
through Buenaventura, vast amounts of public and private capital, from the Colombian 
government and investors from Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, are being funneled 
into infrastructure megaprojects. In addition to the three existing port terminals, there are 
three more at various stages of completion: the Container Terminal of Buenaventura 
(TCBUEN) is already in operation, the Port of Agua Dulce is under construction, and the 
Port of the Dagua River Delta is currently the focus of environmental impact studies. A 
new multi-lane highway from Buenaventura to the interior is being planned, the cargo 
train to Cali has been brought back into operation, a logistical operations center is in 
development, the main shipping canal is being dredged to accommodate larger ships, and 
funding has already been allocated for the building of a waterfront promenade, or 
malecón, that would ring the southern edge of the island with hotels, restaurants, dance 
clubs, and casinos. Further on the horizon is a trans-Andean railroad that would cross 750 
miles and three mountain ranges to connect Buenaventura with the Orinoco River on the 
Venezuelan border.
8
 These future plans literally and figuratively submerge all other 
alternatives. 
Alongside visions of international commerce and port expansion, another set of 
forces is actively reshaping the relationship between land and sea in Buenaventura. These 
projections are tied to a second imminent transformation that is a good deal less 
optimistic: global climate change. Despite typical problems in predicting what the 
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warming of the planet will mean on a local level, a range of techniques are used to 
estimate the potential impacts of climate change on the future of Colombia’s ports 
(Amado et al. 2011:81). There is now general agreement that climate change is likely to 
make port operations and logistics in Buenaventura increasingly problematic in the years 
to come. 
According to IPCC predictions, the world’s tropical areas will experience 
increased magnitude and intensity of rainfall, especially considering the possible 
interaction between climate change and the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, which has a 
major impact on Colombia’s climate (Lampis and Fraser 2012:14). There is evidence that 
precipitation events in some parts of Colombia have already become more intense 
(Aguilar et al. 2005), and increased average rainfall has been observed in Buenaventura 
(Amado et al. 2011:42). Moreover, the Colombian national scientific body has reported a 
2.2 mm rise in sea level over the previous 40 years at a monitoring station in 
Buenaventura (IDEAM 2010). Together, increased rainfall and rising sea levels appear to 
pose serious threats to the port and the city. The government’s vulnerability assessment 
of potential climate change impacts identified Buenaventura as among the most critical 
zones in the country (Lampis and Fraser 2012:31). These ominous forecasts are 
producing their own material effects: additional port facilities to reduce operational 
delays due to inclement weather; further dredging to counteract sedimentation of the 
shipping canal caused by higher rainfall; and the relocation of seaside populations to 
protect them from flooding (Amado et al. 2011:121). By justifying displacement in the 
name of port expansion and disaster risk management, visions of a submerged future 
contribute to the precarity of life in Buenaventura’s intertidal zone. 
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The third force reshaping the relationship between land and sea results from 
intensely violent battles for control over strategically important areas. Buenaventura is of 
major interest to drug traffickers looking for clandestine routes through which to move 
their product north. Since the risks of exporting cocaine by air or across the Caribbean 
have increased, impoverished seaside settlements are prime locations for launching small 
watercraft that connect up with speedboats bound for Central America and Mexico. With 
the disintegration of the once-powerful drug cartels from Cali and Medellín and the 
reorganization of right-wing paramilitary groups following their official 
“demobilization,” competition for control over drug trafficking routes has led to violent 
clashes between highly volatile criminal units the Colombian government calls “emergent 
criminal gangs” (or bacrim). Although FARC guerrillas play a role in the drug trade, and 
maintain a presence in nearby rural areas, the enigmatic bacrim have infiltrated the city 
and regularly terrorize its inhabitants. These militias, security experts believe, are a direct 
outgrowth of the notorious paramilitary groups that once controlled large swaths of the 
county and enjoyed political immunity. This new form of paramilitarism is “less 
ideological and more mafioso” than its predecessor, as one journalist put it, and is 
characterized by deadly rivalries between competing factions.
9
 The interstitial space 
between land and sea has become the primary battlefield on which these rivalries are 
fought out. 
A wave of violence washed over Buenaventura in October 2012 as Los Urabeños 
declared war on La Empresa, the militia that had dominated the city for years. The police 
department registered 66 murders over a four-month period as the two groups engaged in 
open-air battles in the streets. This figure is astronomical for a city of only 350,000 
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people, but other public agencies have placed the death toll much higher. Although 
forced disappearances are more difficult to count, the official number spiked from 57 in 
2011 to 113 in 2012. Mass graves have been discovered along with errant body parts in 
the rivers and mangrove swamps that abut the city. Fear and intimidation have sent 
thousands of residents of Buenaventura fleeing; in late 2012, the government agency 
responsible for monitoring armed conflict reported eight episodes of mass displacement 
in just two weeks, resulting in over 4,000 people forced from their homes. While the 
conflict is undoubtedly fueled by the drug trade, many believe that port expansion zones 
are also primary objectives (cf. Ballvé, 2012). As a neighborhood leader explained to a 
journalist: “What’s at the bottom of this violence is not just drug trafficking, but 
territorial control over the city. It’s a tactic of terror to get the people to move from the 
paramilitary-controlled waterfront areas and flee to the rural zones so that the 
megaprojects can have free rein. The mafiosos, allied with businessmen, want to force 
people out through fear.”10 While the police and the armed forces try to establish their 
authority in contested areas, activists and religious leaders have denounced them for 
being suspiciously slow to act.
11
 In Buenaventura, black lives seem to matter less than the 
vision of development that depends on maintaining the population in a state of protracted 
precarity. Submergent forms of political life have become both strategic and necessary. 
 
The Vortex: Bajamar 
As the song “My Buenaventura” suggests, the relationship between land and sea 
goes deeper than international shipping, climate change, and drug trafficking. It’s a fluid 
world, the Pacific coast, with levels of rainfall surpassing even the wettest parts of the 
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tropics and a vast system of rivers that descend from the mountains to the ocean. The city 
of Buenaventura was founded on an island, the Isla de Cascajal, which now hosts the 
commercial center, government offices, and a large percentage of the residential 
population, and even the more recent areas of expansion on the continental side are 
transected by numerous rivers and streams (Aprile-Gniset 2002). Aside from a small 
hillock near downtown, the city is largely flat with depressions and low-lying areas 
throughout. In fact, the ground is so saturated with water that, from as early as 1860, 
building sites on the island had to be filled in with earth before construction could 
proceed (Gärtner 2005). The population of Buenaventura grew in the mid-twentieth 
century, as Afro-Colombians migrated to the city from nearby river basins and 
established their settlements in a similar manner—that is, by reclaiming land from the 
sea. Habituated to riverine life, these migrants gravitated to the edge of the bay, or to the 
inlets, mudflats, and mangrove swamps that abut and interpenetrate the city on all sides 
(Mosquera Torres and Aprile-Gniset 2006). There they built houses on stilts, adapted to 
the brackish estuary’s tidal fluctuations, which allowed them to maintain access to fishing 
resources, their primary ancestral livelihood (Mosquera Torres 2010). Submergence is a 
socio-material fact in Buenaventura’s intertidal zone.  
These seaside settlements are now occupied by an estimated 110,000 inhabitants, 
mostly Afro-Colombian. Collectively known as Bajamar (meaning “low tide”), they are 
home to approximately one third of the city’s total population. Positioned at the interface 
between land and water, Bajamar has become the vortex of the economic, ecological, and 
political forces converging on Buenaventura. The national and local governments see 
Bajamar as an obstacle to development since it occupies the land on which megaprojects 
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are slated to be built. This vision, which combines technical and aesthetic criteria for how 
a “world-class port city” should look and function, would require the displacement of the 
majority of its residents. So, too, projections of the potential impacts of global climate 
change identify these settlements as highly vulnerable and in need of relocation. 
According to the city’s recently created risk management agency, the imperative to create 
a “resilient” Buenaventura demands the removal of low-lying occupations classified as 
“high risk.” Finally, wars between rival paramilitary groups and state security forces are 
concentrated in these very same areas due to their strategic importance to the economies, 
both legal and illegal, that depend on Buenaventura for access to overseas markets. A lot 
of money is at stake in these battles for territorial control, and not just by trafficking 
drugs, but by using violence, torture, and intimidation to facilitate ostensibly legal 
commerce. The result is even greater violence and displacement in Bajamar, making it 
one of the most concentrated “zones of black death” in the Americas today. 
Port expansion, climate change adaptation, and paramilitary violence actively 
reinforce one another. Projections of increased rainfall and rising sea levels further 
motivate dredging operations already justified by visions of booming trade among 
countries of the Pacific Basin, adding additional urgency to port expansion plans 
previously bolstered by economic imperatives alone. Dredging subsequently increases 
tidal fluctuations and storm surges in the Bay of Buenaventura, making flood risk even 
more pronounced in waterfront areas and thereby strengthening the resolve of relocation 
projects in designated “zones of high risk.” These combined pressures make residents of 
Bajamar more vulnerable to paramilitary groups fighting for control over their territories. 
Ultimately, the violence inflicted on these communities by rival militias makes otherwise 
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undesirable state-led relocation projects appear preferable to forced displacement carried 
out at gunpoint without compensation. In turn, the exodus of residents fleeing the threat 
of death or dismemberment feeds back to encourage capital investment in the 
development of port infrastructure. It is worth noting that, just as the raging violence of 
late 2012 reached its zenith, the multinational port operations conglomerate based in 
Dubai, DP World, which owns 60 maritime terminals in six continents, paid $150 million 
for the majority share of Regional Port Society of Buenaventura.
12
 As a local religious 
leader put it, “Paramilitaries and development go hand in hand.”  
According to an Afro-Colombian activist, this is how dispossession is 
accomplished: “First a bunch of whites and mestizos come in and say they want to buy 
the land. It could be the government or it could be private buyers. It’s all on the up and 
up. Some people might accept the offer, but in general the majority of people don’t want 
to leave, so they say no.” Then, he said, outsiders appear with claims to ownership based 
on falsified documents. Meanwhile, the mayor’s office designates the area a “zone of 
high risk” and orders that residents be relocated to a landlocked housing project. “But we 
everyone knows what’s behind all this,” the activist asserted. “They don’t want to consult 
us. They don’t want us to decide whether to move or not. Relocation, if it’s going to 
happen, has to be voluntary. Instead, when people make it clear they don’t want to move, 
that’s when the paramilitaries come in.” 
The activist then recounted a recent example of relocation-at-gunpoint. He said an 
unknown group arrived in trucks blasting music and carrying alcohol to throw a block 
party. “When the party was over,” he said, “a bunch of guys with weapons stayed behind. 
They set up check-points to control who came and went. If people they didn’t recognize 
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entered, they questioned them. If they didn’t like what they heard, those people never 
came back out.” Then the group took control of the electricity network, shutting off the 
lights at 8pm as a tactic of intimidation. “They call these groups bacrim,” he reflected; 
“but it’s the same old thing. Just like in the rural areas, paramilitaries clear people off 
their land so businesses can come in and make millions. Their objective is to evacuate 
territory, just as it has always been. Here in Buenaventura it’s the same situation. They 
pressure them until they find it too difficult and flee.” In spite of the precarity of 
everyday life, though deeply affected by it, many residents of Bajamar refuse to leave 
without a fight. A submergent politics is the result, whereby Afro-Colombians work both 
within and outside formations of liberal governance and their logics of vulnerability and 
protection. 
 
The Politics of Urban Blackness 
The vast majority of Buenaventura’s 350,000 inhabitants are of African descent, 
and the city has long been an important site for Afro-Colombian politics and activism. 
This means that the efforts of residents of Bajamar to resist displacement and 
dispossession, and the opportunities and constraints they encounter, are conditioned by 
ethno-racial politics in Colombia and, in particular, by how black populations are 
positioned, and position themselves, as legal and political subjects.
13
 Since the adoption 
of a new constitution in 1991, the Colombian state has recognized itself officially as 
“multicultural” and “pluri-ethnic.” The 1991 Constitution established a number of 
protections for the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity, including the mandate to create 
comprehensive legislation for the black population. The subsequent passage of Law 70, 
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or the Law of Black Communities, in 1993 granted Afro-Colombians both symbolic 
recognition within the official narrative of Colombian history as well as rights to 
collective land title, to cultural protection, to the benefits of development, and to be 
consulted on development projects that affect them. Crucially, Law 70 granted these 
rights to comunidades negras (“black communities”) officially defined as a culturally 
distinct ethnic group.
14
 As Tianna Paschel (2010:730) points out, this landmark piece of 
legislation followed the logic of “ethnic difference” and “cultural identity” rather than 
“racial equality” or “racial justice.” This multiculturalist codification constituted the 
black political subject in particular ways, which continue to shape the territorial struggles 
underway in Bajamar. Oscillating in and out of this fixed subject position, inhabiting it at 
one moment and critiquing it at another, is a submergent political tactic. 
The Process of Black Communities (or PCN for short), which has its base in 
Buenaventura, is one of the primary organizations advocating for Afro-Colombian rights. 
PCN is better characterized as an activist network than a single group, and its influence 
extends throughout the rural black communities of the Pacific coast (Asher 2009; Escobar 
2008). Many of these communities live in resource-rich areas frequently under attack by 
paramilitary groups allied with agribusiness, mining, or energy companies. PCN’s efforts 
to defend Afro-Colombian territories against the threat of forced displacement reflect the 
political geography of multiculturalism in Colombia (cf. Bocarejo, 2012, 2014).
15
 As 
Paschel argues, the outcome of the negotiations that led to the passage of Law 70 was 
that “the rural black political subject...would become the prototype for granting rights to 
black populations in Colombia” (2010:749). However, as forced displacement and 
territorial dispossession continue to push Afro-Colombians into cities like Buenaventura 
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(Oslender 2007), and as these same dynamics increasingly unfold within cities, PCN 
(2011) faces the question of what black political subjectivity means in an urban context. 
The displacement pressures mounting in Buenaventura principally affect 
territories that have been occupied by Afro-descendent populations for over 50 years in 
some cases, which have more recently become politically and economically strategic. A 
PCN activist called these comunidades afro-urbanas (“Afro-urban communities”). This 
particular combination of ethno-racial and spatial classifications intentionally disrupts the 
automatic association of the black population with the rural territories of the Pacific 
coast. Although it explicitly marks a difference between urban and rural Afro-
Colombians, their collective rights regardless of location are at stake here.  
The imperative to articulate a black urban politics raises fundamental questions 
about both ethno-racial and urban politics in Colombia. Given the territorially-bound and 
ethnically-based logic of state multiculturalism that has developed over the past two 
decades, what rights do Afro-Colombians have, what protections are they entitled to, and 
what demands can they make on the state when they do not resemble the figure of the 
rural black political subject? And if the logic of cultural protection undergirds the 
political, legal, and discursive structures within which black populations are positioned, 
and position themselves, what opportunities and constraints does this create for activists 
and residents struggling to resist displacement and dispossession? 
PCN leaders argue that the systematic clearance of land required for port 
expansion megaprojects in Buenaventura, whether done legally by the municipal 
government or illegally by paramilitary groups, violates the right to consulta previa (prior 
consultation). This is the formal mechanism, established following Law 70, that entitles 
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black communities to participate in decisions regarding development projects that affect 
them. But juridically speaking there is no rights infringement since prior consultation 
applies only to “black communities” as defined by law—that is, those with collective title 
to rural lands—rather to the Afro-Colombian population as a whole. The same is true, a 
PCN activist explained, for the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law, which mandates 
the restoration of property to rural communities who had been forced by the armed 
conflict to abandon it. 
They tell us that the only legitimate subjects of reparation are the 
communities with collective land title. Imagine that. In [the region of] 
Buenaventura, there have been more than 1,500 violent deaths in 5 years 
[the number of forced displacements is much higher], and not all of these 
have been in rural areas or in consejos comunitarios (community councils, 
or the political entity of black communities) with collective land title. 
Urban communities have been terrorized by the violence as well. It is 
impossible to make the state understand that this community is also a 
“black community” despite the fact that it has the same cultural practices 
and is in a situation of forced displacement. Our territorial rights must be 
extended to urban areas…We need a broader concept of prior consultation 
and land restitution. 
 
At present, these entitlements submerge Afro-Colombians in the city within the generic 
urban population, rendering them unintelligible to formations of liberal multiculturalism. 
As a result, many activists see the need to establish Afro-Colombian rights in (and 
to) the city. They argue that the distinction between the “urban” and the “rural,” once 
codified in legislation and public policy, segments the black population and limits its 
collective entitlements. In the words of a PCN leader:  
We see much of Buenaventura as an extension of el campo poblado (the 
settled countryside) that has come about in the same way that black 
communities have been occupying and inhabiting territory throughout 
history. The work that has gone into settling and consolidating these areas 
[such as Bajamar] is tremendous, filling in the mudflats, building houses 
supported by stilts, establishing infrastructure, and so on. They have 
established a colony here just like they have everywhere else. 
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Settlement patterns are not all that defies the rural/urban divide. Forced displacement, 
which has disproportionately affected Afro-Colombians, ensures that stable, long-term 
relationships between people and place are untenable. Tying political recognition to the 
historical occupation of land ignores the fact that survival often depends on mobility. But 
moving to cities rarely means abandoning established cultural practices, social relations, 
and sources of livelihood, and many urban Afro-Colombians maintain dynamic 
connections with their communities of origin. No matter how the “urban” is defined, it is 
difficult to maintain the clear divide with the “rural” on Colombia’s Pacific coast. 
 
Vulnerability and Protection 
In light of the political and legal constraints encountered by black activists and 
residents in Buenaventura, other creative strategies for marking territory have emerged in 
response to the threat of displacement. For example, many reject the use of the name 
Bajamar, meaning literally “low tide,” to refer to these neighborhoods since this implies 
they are both ecologically vulnerable and legally suspect: ecologically vulnerable since 
low-lying tidal areas have been identified as having the highest levels of flood risk; 
legally suspect since permanent human settlement is prohibited by law within 50 meters 
of the high-tide line. Both implications lead to the same conclusion—mandatory 
relocation—although they are justified according to different governmental imperatives: 
the former by the imperative to manage disaster risk (or adapt to climate change) and the 
latter by the imperative to uphold the rule of law. “We call these areas territorios 
ganados al mar (territories reclaimed from the sea),” a local leader told me, positioning 
these settlements within the frame of development and progress. Rather than passive 
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victims in precarious conditions, residents become active agents domesticating nature and 
putting it to use. 
“Marking territory” is more than just a process by which people give meaning to 
place and establish claims to ownership; in Buenaventura, it is also the name of a cultural 
project in the disputed “low-tide” neighborhood of Barrio Lleras. Marcando Territorio 
was formed when activists and church leaders joined forces with a collective of 
producers, rappers, and singers to set up a recording studio. In 2010, a local parish priest 
organized a rap competition, which drew such a large turnout that the collective decided 
to shoot a music video. In December of that year, they uploaded the result, which also 
bore the name “Marcando Territorio,” to YouTube. 
The video begins in black and white with a casual meeting on the street between 
three members of the group. One informs the other two that residents of Barrio Lleras are 
being displaced from their homes. The ones receiving the news are alarmed, and the three 
quickly decide to compose a song in response. As the trio marches through the streets of 
the neighborhood, gathering followers as they go, they discuss what the song will be 
about. “I’ve got the theme,” one says. “How does it go?,” another asks. “Marcando 
territorio,” he responds. Excelente, mi homie, he fires back. The video then shifts into 
color, and cuts to a large group assembled in a semi-circle facing the camera. 
The song is over ten minutes long, and features rapid-fire performances by more 
than twenty rappers of all ages over a reggaeton beat. Forced displacement, rights 
violations, unified resistance—ultimately, marking territory—are common themes. The 
song became an instant hit in Barrio Lleras and throughout other seaside settlements in 
Buenaventura facing the same pressures. It was eventually featured in a series of articles 
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and short documentary videos produced by Al Jazeera in 2011. The group that formed 
around this project then recorded a second music video with support from the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees. They have since released a single under the title Consulta 
Previa, referencing the right that they have been denied as plans to replace their 
neighborhood with a waterfront promenade move forward. Three of the masterminds 
behind the original project, all of them in their early twenties, were emphatic about their 
music’s intended effect: 
Since most of us are against relocation, violence is the only way to clear 
us out. We did the song to show people that it’s possible to stop all that. At 
that moment [of making the video], people were starting to give up their 
properties and accept relocation. Our song made them think twice.  
 
However, the success of their campaign also made them enemies: 
Initially, some of the neighborhood leaders got upset. They had been paid 
to get others to accept the deal, to convince people to relocate. Imagine: a 
group of crazies coming along with a music video saying the people of 
Barrio Lleras aren’t going anywhere. We received a bunch of threats and 
had to lower our profile after that. 
 
Ethnomusicologist Michael Birenbaum Quintero suggests that projecting music 
loudly into urban space is one of the few forms of political expression possible in 
Buenaventura.
16
 While Marcando Territorio seeks to be seen and heard, using a range of 
communication strategies to publicize their message (such as YouTube as well as local 
performances), they must also be careful to moderate their audibility and visibility. 
Activists, journalists, and politically engaged musicians throughout Colombia, and 
especially in Buenaventura, are often targets of intimidation and violence.
17
 Many 
regularly rotate through SIM cards and arrange their meetings in protected places. A 
climate of fear pervades everyday life in Buenaventura, and it is multiplied for those who 
speak or act out. Their politics, like the intertidal zone in which they work, must exist 
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both below and above the surface, occasionally submerging itself only to resurface later 
when the time is right. This is true for those explicitly engaged in political activism, but 
similar strategies are adopted by residents of Bajamar as they go about their daily 
routines. Even the simplest of acts, such as crossing the city to visit a relative who lives 
in another neighborhood, demand extreme measures of precaution. 
As the song “Marking Territory” makes clear, the contemporary relationship 
between the port and the city, between land and sea, is not nearly as harmonious as it was 
when “My Buenaventura” was written. Residents of the seaside settlements of Bajamar 
are now subject to a number of different threats: climate change, paramilitary violence, 
port expansion. Which threats are real and which are contrived depends on who you ask: 
the national and municipal governments say these areas are vulnerable to flooding but 
that residents invent stories about paramilitary groups in order to demand state protection; 
activists, religious leaders, and settlers say that these areas are vulnerable to paramilitary 
violence but that flood risk merely justifies their displacement. These different 
perspectives converge on the category of vulnerability. 
The director of the municipal risk management agency explained why the 
inhabitants of terrenos de bajamar had to be relocated: 
The national government passed Law 1523 in 2012, and this required 
Buenaventura to have a risk management agency. We’re following the 
letter of the law. In terms of territorial planning, risk management has to 
be the first step. This is the first step in creating and implementing a 
master plan. Everything has to be done from the point of view of risk. Risk 
must prevail above everything else we do in terms of planning and 
development. These areas [Bajamar] are living with risk because we didn’t 
plan well in the past. From now on, that will have to change. 
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At the General Maritime Directorate (DIMAR), the national authority for coastal 
regulation, the naval captain assigned to the Port of Buenaventura described this as a 
more straightforward problem of illegality: 
The majority of the city is in zonas de bajamar (low-tide zones). These 
properties are bienes de uso public (for public use only). The residents are 
asking for water delivery, for electricity, for sewage, for basic services. 
But the regulations won’t allow it, since these are invasions of public 
space. City Hall is supposed to do the relocation along with the police. We 
don’t have the manpower to go in and do evictions. That’s their job. 
 
But while the naval captain did not resort to the logic of disaster risk management to 
justify resettlement, he nevertheless concurred with the municipal government’s 
evaluation: “The zonas de bajamar are extremely vulnerable. In the event of a tsunami, 
this is the first part of the city that is going to flood.” 
Residents of Buenaventura’s seaside settlements emphasize their own 
vulnerability, though in different ways. For example, one of the members of the 
collective, Marcando Territorio, dismissed ecological threats while emphasizing human 
ones: 
Now they’re talking about the risk of tsunami. They say that we have to be 
relocated because this is a “zone of high risk.” I’ve lived here for four 
years; him 5 years; he’s been here his whole life; others have been here for 
two or three generations. Now there’s a tsunami threat? [All laugh.] We’re 
not against development, but there are other interests behind all this. They 
say we live in “Bajamar,” that we’re vulnerable. They say that we’re “at 
risk.” But what about them? Are they super anti-tsunami? Are they so 
prepared that they don’t need to worry? They say this area will flood. But 
a tsunami would wreck the whole city. The best option would be to 
negotiate with people so they can stay in their homes. Our proposal is 
neighborhood improvement. But we’re afraid that what happened in la 
Imaculada [a similar settlement on the other side of the city] with the 
expansion of TCBUEN [port terminal] is going to happen here. You 
know, the paramilitaries infiltrate the barrio and say, “You have to sell or 
sell.” [All laugh.] We know how it works. They’ll say, Para sobrevivir 
tienen que salir. “You have to leave if you want to survive.” 
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A religious leader introduced another possibility, which complicated the distinction 
between the (false) threat of flooding and the (real) threat of displacement: “They’re 
trying to get people out of here any way they can. I wouldn’t be surprised if they 
eventually flood these areas and get people to move that way. After all, they need higher 
water levels to get the really big ships in and out of the bay, so it would serve two 
purposes at the same time.” Although the cause of vulnerability is in question, 
“vulnerability” as an ontological condition is not. 
A politics of protection is the logical extension. Given the history of ethno-racial 
politics in Colombia, “cultural protection” is already the overarching rationality of state 
multiculturalism within which Afro-Colombians are positioned as political subjects. For 
example, to demand that plans for a new mining operation recognize its potentially 
harmful impact on black communities, their representatives bear the burden of 
demonstrating that the project poses a threat to their “culture” and jeopardizes their right 
to difference. For the purpose of contrast, the argument that Afro-Colombians have been 
historically discriminated against, are the victims of racism, and are exposed 
disproportionately to the negative effects of development has very little legal or political 
traction at present in Colombia. To be recognized as subjects deserving of the state’s 
protective care, Afro-Colombians must position themselves as lives at risk in a cultural 
sense (cf. Zeiderman 2013). 
Since the creation of the legal and political framework for the cultural protection 
of black communities in 1993, the Colombian state has established other forms of 
protection for the population at large and for Afro-Colombians in particular. In 2004, for 
example, the Constitutional Court declared a crisis of internal forced displacement and 
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ordered the state to guarantee the rights of desplazados, or displaced persons, and to 
protect their lives. In 2009, the Court issued a subsequent ruling recognizing Afro-
Colombians as “subjects of special protection” in “conditions of special vulnerability,” 
requiring “state authorities at all levels to exercise particular diligence with respect to the 
special duties of prevention, care, and protection of the individual and collective rights of 
victims of forced displacement among the Afro-Colombian population.” Through these 
and other measures pertaining to the vulnerability of victims of violence, Afro-
Colombians are now subject to mechanisms of protection that are both multicultural and 
biopolitical. The state imagines itself as the benevolent patriarchal protector of different 
forms of life as well as of life itself.  
In this context, Afro-Colombian urban politics is intelligible to the state provided 
it conforms to a politics of vulnerability (cf. Cárdenas 2012:130-131). The protection of 
life, in both multicultural and biopolitical terms, shapes the opportunities and constraints 
activists and residents encounter. The intersection between the 1993 Law of Black 
Communities and the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law is a perfect example.
18
 
Although the former establishes rights based on the argument that different forms of life 
are valuable to the extent that they are culturally distinct, the latter grants entitlements 
according to a commitment to life itself. The overarching logic in both cases is 
protection, and the capacity of subjects to engage in political relationships with the state 
depends on their ability to position themselves as lives, and as forms of life, under threat. 
However, multicultural and biopolitical protection often come into conflict, such as when 
restitution for victims of violence with collective rights are dealt with as individual lives. 
As PCN activists argue: 
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Our collective life is linked to the defense and recreation of the ancestral 
cultural practices that differentiate us. When the war comes to our 
territories, it damages individual life but also collective life. What the state 
does is respond to the damages done to individual life: for a death, the 
state pays 7 million pesos. If you lost your home, they give you a new one 
in an urban area. But the state does not measure damage to collective life. 
Behind these deaths, behind this territorial dispossession, behind this 
displacement, there is a whole social and cultural fabric. When that is 
damaged, what is at risk is the survival of the black community as 
such…The collective life of the black community is in imminent danger.19 
 
The Colombian state, they stress, must therefore create space for the protection of all 
forms of life that exist, rather than just life itself. 
Biopolitical and multicultural forms of protection also clash in the relocation of 
seaside settlements in Buenaventura. Resettlement plans are justified by the imperatives 
of disaster risk management and climate change adaptation, both of which are predicated 
on the state’s responsibility to protect life in its most basic biological sense. Since this 
biopolitical form of protection would ultimately result in territorial dispossession, Afro-
Colombian activists respond with multicultural arguments. They oppose the imperative to 
protect life itself by saying that it jeopardizes their different form of life. What is not in 
question is that black political subjectivity is legible—politically and legally—to the 
extent that it is vulnerable to threat and in need of protection. These formations of liberal 
governance and their multicultural and biopolitical logics of recognition both enable and 
constrain efforts to resist displacement and dispossession in Buenaventura. 
 
Submergent Politics 
In conclusion, it remains to consider what the territorial struggles underway in 
Buenaventura’s seaside settlements suggest about the politics of precarity under late 
liberalism. In contemporary social theory, tropes of insurgence and emergence are used 
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frequently to designate novel political formations. Citing active processes of becoming, 
these tropes point to the fact that existing theories are inadequate for understanding how 
popular politics is unfolding around the world. Although I share with these analyses a 
general discomfort with resorting to abstract universals (e.g., freedom, democracy, 
citizenship, rights) as the automatic referent for political analysis and critique, this article 
takes a slightly different tack by sketching the outlines of a politics of submergence. 
Literally designating the state of being inundated by a relative rise in water levels, 
submergence draws our attention to the socio-material relationship between land and sea 
as well as to the political condition of being resigned or forced to descend below the 
surface, to cover oneself or be covered over, to remain obscure and invisible. While 
critical reflexivity is necessary when using water metaphors to generate theory 
(Helmreich 2011), there are at least three reasons why the socio-material conditions of 
the intertidal zone, and in particular the figure of submergence, are both appropriate for 
comprehending the racialized politics of precarity under late liberalism. 
The first is that submergence offers us a way to think about forms of political life 
under conditions of heightened insecurity, which are in turn shaped by overarching logics 
of vulnerability and protection, both multicultural and biopolitical. This is the situation 
that Afro-Colombians are forced to confront given the history of ethno-racial politics and 
racialized dispossession in Colombia, which is underwritten by a tacit devaluation of 
black lives. Submergent politics unfolds specifically within what we might call “fragile 
republics” in which politics in its various normative guises is impeded or prohibited by 
regimes of lawlessness and terror, especially for those who are exposed 
disproportionately to violence. We need to look beyond familiar frames of reference for 
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other conceptual tools that can help us understand forms of cultural and political practice 
in places like Buenaventura. If insurgence is about rising up in active resistance or revolt 
to claim membership, entitlement, or authority, and emergence is about the concrete 
manifestation of the vital, irreducible, creative potential imminent to life itself, 
submergence illuminates a politics that makes no such claims and has more modest 
pretentions. In contexts of protracted precarity, remaining beneath the surface, rendering 
oneself concealed and undetectable, may be strategic or even necessary. Such political 
positioning is reflected in the efforts of Afro-Colombian activists in Buenaventura and 
residents of seaside settlements living under the perpetual threat of paramilitary violence. 
In order to pursue change and survive to see the results, they must often work behind 
closed doors and out of sight, or in the interstices of visibility and invisibility. 
Secondly, the figure of submergence helps us understand forms of political life 
specific to the crisis of legitimacy plaguing late liberalism. Like tropes of insurgence and 
emergence, it allows us to appreciate novel formations of political subjectivity and 
collectivity that stretch and strain liberal values and institutions in unexpected ways, that 
expand or challenge their established frames of recognition, or that defy the 
liberal/illiberal binary altogether. For example, it contends with situations in which 
liberal ideals such as free will, universality, equality, and transparency are less central 
than demands for protection, claims to dependence, assertions of difference, or other 
“illiberal” political aspirations. Likewise, the politics of submergence points to deep 
divisions of race, class, gender, and sexuality that fragment the social world, working 
within forms of difference, hierarchy, and opacity rather than assuming their progressive 
and eventual disappearance. As liberal governance is frequently consistent with extreme 
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forms of racialized violence and dispossession—selecting only certain cultural and 
economic values to be protected—descending below the horizon of intelligibility, 
covering oneself up or over, and ensuring obscurity are strategies employed by those 
whose lives are rendered perpetually precarious. 
Finally, the politics of submergence points to concrete socio-material processes, 
such as flooding, sea-level rise, tidal flows, hurricanes, and tsunamis. Designating the 
potential or actual predicament of being below the surface of the water, it speaks to the 
political and ecological mutations provoked by global environmental change. For 
scholars and activists alike, these mutations demand a heightened sensitivity to socio-
material relations, to human-nonhuman entanglements, and to political communities of 
people and things. As with the crisis of legitimacy facing late liberalism, especially in 
conditions of heightened insecurity, again there is the need for conceptual tools 
appropriate to contemporary political formations—ones that also account for the 
planetary transformations wrought by climate change. One line of thinking connects these 
transformations to a “post-political” evacuation of radical critique and ideological 
conflict from the space of public debate, the reduction of politics to consensus-building 
and policy-making, and the triumph of technocratic, managerial liberalism as the 
hegemonic form of global governance (Rancière 2009; Swyngedouw 2010; Žižek 2008). 
However, this argument is too quick to declare a break between the “political” past and 
the “post-political” present and surprisingly uninterested in actually existing politics that 
do not conform to its normative expectations. In highlighting the territorial struggles of 
Afro-Colombians in Buenaventura’s intertidal zone, submergence points to other political 
currents below the surface. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 This article draws primarily on interviews and site visits conducted in 2013 during two 
short stays of two to three weeks each in Buenaventura. One visit coincided with an event 
that brought together activists, community leaders, NGOs, municipal authorities, lawyers, 
urbanists, and members of the interested public to discuss the question of territorios afro-
urbanos (“Afro-urban territories”). The argument is based also on interviews conducted 
with activists, humanitarian workers, and government officials in Bogotá as well analysis 
of policy and planning documents, media archives, and communications materials. 
Approximately 25 interviews were conducted in total, and all names have been changed 
or omitted to protect anonymity. Since Afro-Colombian activists are frequently subjected 
to death threats and violence, I also avoid using personally identifying pronouns. Though 
long-term fieldwork in Buenaventura was deemed unfeasible due to the security situation, 
supporting the analysis are over two years of ethnographic research in Colombia (2008-
2010, with subsequent follow-up visits) on the politics of security, vulnerability, and 
protection. 
2
 Although “liberalism” is by no means a singular phenomenon, but rather “a set of 
spatially dispersed tactics” that “appears under a consistent name” (Povinelli, 2013a:30), 
postcolonial studies have pointed out that it is often inadequate to the task of 
understanding popular politics around the world (Chatterjee 2004). 
3
 Katherine McKittrick touches on the dangers of naturalizing anti-black violence through 
its repetition in scholarly work (Hudson 2014). Without pretending to resolve this 
analytical predicament, I avoid the assumption that naming and describing black death 
somehow denaturalizes it. Instead, I aim to probe some of the limits and possibilities of 
political formations that respond to racial violence and injustice. 
4
 I am most grateful for Katherine McKittrick’s editorial guidance and for pointing me to 
the work of Kamau Brathwaite and other Caribbean writers and intellectuals, whose 
writings on “submergence” and the sea I have found productive and inspiring. 
5
 A parallel can be drawn with Edouard Glissant’s “forced poetics,” or the language 
“practiced by a community which cannot express itself directly through an autonomous 
activity of its members” (1976:96). Among slaves, Glissant writes, “expression was 
cautious, reticent, whispered at night” (1976:96). Another source of inspiration is James 
Scott’s (1985, 1992) work on popular political expression under conditions of 
domination.  
6
 My focus here is somewhat different from the literature that critically examines 
articulations of race, space, and nature (Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003; Brahinsky, 
Sasser, and Minkoff-Zern 2014) and legacies of environmental injustice (Pulido 2000). 
7
 A parallel line of inquiry in urban studies takes seriously the “where” of urban politics 
(Rodgers, Barnett, and Cochrane 2014) in order to construct new “grammars of urban 
justice and injustice” (MacLeod and McFarlane 2014). 
8
 “Conozca los megaproyectos de Buenaventura,” El Tiempo, November 24, 2012. 
9
 Alfredo Molano Jimeno, “Buenaventura, entre la pobreza y la violencia,” El 
Espectador, February 23, 2013. 
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10
 Alfredo Molano Jimeno, “Buenaventura, entre la pobreza y la violencia,” El 
Espectador, February 23, 2013 and “La guerra por los terrenos del área urbana,” El 
Espectador, February 24, 2013. 
11
 “Iglesia denuncia retoma paramilitar en Buenaventura,” El Tiempo, November 9, 2012. 
12
 “Arabes invierten en Puerto de Buenaventura,” El Tiempo, October 24, 2012; Michele 
Talbot, “DP World takes 19% stake in Colombian terminal for $150m,” Seatrade 
Maritime News, July 15, 2013. 
13
 Much has been written on Afro-Colombian activism, politics, and social movements, 
and my analysis relies heavily on the work of others (Paschel 2010; Wade 2002; Escobar 
2008; Restrepo 2004; Asher 2009; Oslender 2007; Valencia 2011; Cárdenas 2012b; 
Restrepo and Rojas 2004). It has been recognized that geography matters to ethno-racial 
politics in Colombia (Oslender 2011; Bocarejo 2012), and studies have examined issues 
facing Afro-descendent migrants and desplazados in cities (Barbary and Urrea 2004; 
Observatorio Contra la Discriminación y el Racismo 2012; Arboleda 2004). However, 
less attention has been paid to the problematic of Afro-Colombian urban politics (cf. 
Agudelo 2004). 
14
 Ethno-racial terminology is highly contested in Colombia. In this article, “black,” 
“Afro-Colombian,” and “Afro-descendent” are used somewhat interchangeably as forms 
of self-identification that are not necessarily based on traceable African origins, whereas 
“black communities” carries a more specific legal and policy meaning. 
15
 Law 70 recognizes “black communities” as those communities “that have traditionally 
occupied the uncultivated (empty) lands in the rural zones adjoining the rivers of the 
Pacific Basin, in accordance with their traditional cultivation practices” and grants them 
“the right to collective property.” 
16
 Birenbaum Quintero (2013) has worked extensively on the music of the Colombian 
Pacific. His suggestive comments about the politics of loudness in Buenaventura come 
from a 2014 conference paper at Stony Brook University. 
17
 Clar Ni Chonghaile, “Colombian activists risk their lives to protect women from gang 
warfare,” The Guardian, October 8, 2014; Teo Ballvé, “Medellín: who’s afraid of hip-
hop?,” openDemocracy, March 4, 2013; Jonathon David Orta, “Paramilitary groups in 
Colombia target journalists,” Journalism in the Americas Blog, 2014. 
18
 Meghan Morris is beginning to shed light on the complex machinations of the land 
restitution process in Colombia. 
19
 Danelly Estupiñan, “An Ongoing Search for Justice and Security in Colombia”s 
Afrodescendent Communities,” organized by WOLA: Washington Office on Latin 
America, March 14, 2013. 
